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BANKING AT THE FED WITH FEDACCOUNTS:  THE DEMISE 
OF COMMERCIAL BANKS? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Approximately 32% of the population, or 90.6 million people, do 
not have access to traditional banking services in America.1  Within this 
population the demographics vary considerably among different racial 
and ethnic groups.2  However, certain groups are more likely to be af-
fected than others.3  For example, unbanked and underbanked consumers 
are more likely than fully banked consumers to have lower incomes and 
be younger, minority, female, unmarried, and unemployed.4 
The terms unbanked and underbanked are distinct.5  Unbanked 
refers to consumers who have no formal relationship at a bank.6  The un-
derbanked are consumers who have a formal relationship with a main-
stream bank but primarily rely on alternative financial institutions for 
their banking or credit needs.7   
Because mainstream banking excludes this segment of the popu-
lation from services offered to fully banked consumers, the unbanked and 
underbanked are more likely to use alternative financial service provid-
ers, a sector of the financial industry often referred to as “fringe 
 
 1. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2017 NAT’L SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED 
HOUSEHOLDS, 1 (2018), available at https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2017/2017re-
port.pdf [hereinafter FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY]. 
 2. See id. at 14–16 (summarizing the issues with this part of the population and con-
ducting statistical studies on the way the group is accessing banking services). 
 3. See Thecla Fabian, One-Fourth of U.S. Households Are Unbanked, Underbanked, 
FDIC Finds, [2010] Banking Daily (BNA), May 6, 2010, https://www.bloomber-
glaw.com/product/bankfinance/document/XAVC87G5GVG0 (discussing the different sec-
tors of the population that is either unbanked or underbanked). 
 4. Id.  
 5. FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 1. 
 6. Morgan Ricks, John Crawford & Lev Menand, Central Banking for All: A Public 
Option for Bank Accounts, GREAT DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE 3 (2018). 
 7. Id.  
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banking.”8  These alternative financial service providers offer services 
such as check cashing, payday lending, and small-dollar loans.9  How-
ever, these services are offered at much higher rates than what main-
stream banks are offering for the same or similar services.10 
 To include this underserved population, there is a current pro-
posal outlined in a paper by Morgan Ricks, John Crawford, and Lev Me-
nand11 to let all individuals have access to bank accounts at the Federal 
Reserve.12  These accounts are referred to as “FedAccounts.”13   
The FedAccounts proposal seeks to make holding a deposit ac-
count with the central bank—currently limited only to banking institu-
tions—available to individuals and nonbank businesses.14  This plan 
would give every consumer and business access to instantaneous pay-
ment transfers, sovereign money, and access to the interest on reserves 
rate (“IOR”).15  If implemented, the FedAccounts system would bring 
about large monetary-financial change to the United States banking sys-
tem.16  
However, FedAccounts will likely not accomplish an important 
goal established in the proposal—fully connecting the unbanked and un-
derbanked population to the banking system.17  Implementing 
 
 8. Mehrsa Baradaran, It’s Time for Postal Banking, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 165 (2014), 
https://harvardlawreview.org/2014/02/its-time-for-postal-banking (stating that the unbanked 
and underbanked population are typically more comfortable with using fringe services). 
 9. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE, CONSUMERS AND MOBILE FINANCIAL 
SERVICES 10 (2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/consumers-and-mobile-fi-
nancial-services-report-201603.pdf. 
 10. See John P. Caskey, Bringing Unbanked Households Into the Banking System, 
BROOKINGS (Jan. 1, 2002), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/bringing-unbanked-house-
holds-into-the-banking-system/ (reviewing the differences between the fringe services and 
mainstream banking and how the unbanked group of consumers could be brought into the 
banking system).   
 11. Morgan Ricks is a professor of law at Vanderbilt Law School, and was previously a 
senior policy advisor at the U.S. Treasury Department.  John Crawford is a professor of law 
at the University of California Hastings College of the Law.  Lev Menand served as Senior 
Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury from 2015 to 2016 and previously worked 
for the Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions.  
 12. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6. 
 13. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 1.  
 14. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 3.  
 15. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 2. 
 16. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 3–4. 
 17. See Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 3–4 (stating that an obvious benefit 
of the FedAccounts program would be financial inclusion for those who are left out of main-
stream financial banking services).  
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FedAccounts would also preclude the private sector from opportunities 
to include this group of consumers in a more complete way.18  Lastly, the 
use of FedAccounts would put unnecessary strain on the banking indus-
try.19   
Further, alternatives such as solutions through state banks, postal 
banking, and mobile financial services better address the issues that the 
unbanked and underbanked population face today.20  Rather than taking 
away opportunities for growth from the private banking sector, these al-
ternatives work alongside private institutions to provide certain banking 
services to those who are harder to reach.21  What is certain is that the 
unbanked and underbanked cannot be left out of mainstream financial 
services any longer.22 
This Note analyzes the FedAccounts proposal and discusses the 
issues and alternatives that would better serve the target population ex-
cluded from mainstream banking.23  This Note proceeds in five parts.  
Part II details the proposal, defines the unbanked and underbanked pop-
ulation, and analyzes the issues with the limited financial services cur-
rently available to them.24  Part III discusses the issues with the proposal 
itself.25  Part IV reviews alternative options better suited to meeting the 
needs of the unbanked and underbanked.26  Part V summarizes the argu-
ments.27 
 
 18. See e.g., Mary Wisniewski, U.S. Bank Launches Payday Loan Alternative for Cash-
Strapped Customers, BANK RATE (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.bankrate.com/banking/us-
bank-new-short-term-loan (stating U.S. Bank’s new alternative to payday lending). 
 19. See Greg Robb, Federal Reserve Should Give Everyone Checking Accounts, New 
Study Says, MARKET WATCH (May 5, 2018),  https://www.marketwatch.com/story/fed-
should-forget-about-its-own-cryptocurrency-and-instead-create-electronic-bank-accounts-
for-everyone-2018-04-30 (explaining some of the risks associated with FedAccounts).  
 20. See e.g., Baradaran, supra note 8 (justifying the proposal of postal banking, an alter-
native to FedAccounts).  
 21. See e.g., Baradaran, supra note 8 (emphasizing the benefits of postal banking). 
 22. Caskey, supra note 10. 
 23. See Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 1 (discussing the proposal and how 
it could possibly fit with the current system).   
 24. See infra Part II.   
 25. See infra Part III. 
 26. See infra Part IV.   
 27. See infra Part V.   
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II.  THE PROPOSAL AND THE POPULATION AT RISK 
A.         What is a FedAccount? 
The FedAccount program would give the general public—indi-
viduals, businesses, and institutions—the option to open bank accounts 
at the Federal Reserve.28  The program claims it will transform the United 
States account-money system into a public infrastructure “akin to roads, 
sidewalks, public libraries, the judicial system, and law enforcement.”29  
FedAccounts would have the functionality of a bank account with “spe-
cial features.”30  These special features include unlimited secure balances, 
instant network payments,31 and higher interest rates.32 The proposal 
states that FedAccounts are able to offer these unlimited secure balances 
due to the deposit balances being “fully sovereign money” with no pos-
sibility of default.33 
By stating higher interest rates, the proposal is referring to the 
fact that the IOR is currently higher than average deposit accounts at 
banking institutions.34  Consumers would be attracted by no-fees and 
higher interest on their deposits.35  Business consumers with over 
$250,000, exceeding the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”) insurance, would be attracted by the guarantee for their entire 
deposit.36 
 
 28. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 1. 
 29. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 4. 
 30. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 1. 
 31. Payments from the FedAccounts would clear immediately just as interbank payments 
clear at the Federal reserve. See Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 1–4. 
 32. See Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 1–4 (stating “higher interest rates,” 
however these rates are just higher currently when compared to the average deposit account 
at banks pay today and have the ability to drop and even go into the negatives). 
 33. See Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 3 (stating that deposits at the Federal 
Reserve would be fully sovereign because they are not lending more than they have such as 
banks, therefore insurance would be unnecessary). 
 34. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEM, INTEREST ON REQUIRED RESERVE 
BALANCES AND EXCESS BALANCES (2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypol-
icy/reqresbalances.htm.   
 35. See Rebecca Wessell, Checking Account Fees: How Much Are They and How Can 
They Be Waived?,  https://www.valuepenguin.com/banking/checking-account-fees (last vis-
ited Feb. 6, 2019) (explaining the price of checking account fees and how they can be a burden 
on consumers). 
 36. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., UNDERSTANDING DEPOSIT INSURANCE (Jan. 2018), 
https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/faq.html.  
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FedAccounts are comparable to bank accounts without overdraft 
coverage.37  The FedAccounts proposal suggests the program will differ-
entiate itself from most banking institutions by having no fees, minimum 
balances, or interchange fees from debit card payments.38  The physical 
location to access these FedAccounts is proposed to be at the offices of 
the United States Postal Service (“USPS”).39  Further, the FedAccount 
program is not a lending program extending credit to consumers.40 
The proposal explains that a FedAccount is “a system for pay-
ments and accounts: a ledger combined with processes and protocols for 
debiting and crediting balances.”41  Among others, the proposed benefits 
include financial inclusion and stability, payment speed and efficiency, 
and increasing trust in government.42  The proposal claims that there 
would be a positive effect on the population from the federal government 
having a program working directly for every consumer.43 
The proposal states that the most obvious result of FedAccounts 
would be financial inclusion, mentioning specifically the unbanked and 
underbanked population.44  Because the system is only valuable if there 
is massive take up, the proposal authors predict a significant transition to 
the FedAccounts due to the incentives associated with them.45  Therefore, 
the plan claims to have benefits for all because of a “boost” in interest 
payments, or the direct pass-through of the IOR,46 paid by the Federal 
Reserve, and immediate payment clearance.47  
 
 37. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 1. 
 38. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 2. 
 39. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 8. 
 40. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 3. 
 41. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 8. 
 42. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 3–6. 
 43. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 12. 
 44. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 1. 
 45. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 6. 
 46. The Federal Reserve pays interest on both interest of required reserves (IORR) and 
interest on excess reserves, but I combine these in referring to the IOR because there required 
reserves are only a small portion of the total.  Further the FedAccount authors refer to the IOR 
throughout.  See Thomas L. Hogan, Bank Lending and Interest on Excess Reserves, Rice 
University Baker Institute for Public Policy, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/me-
dia/files/files/3173032e/workingpaper-banklending-020718.pdf (explaining the effect of IOR 
on bank lending).  
 47. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 1–2. 
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IOR is a fairly recent implementation by the Federal Reserve to 
give interest to banks of their central bank accounts.48  Congress granted 
this power to the Federal Reserve in the Financial Services Regulatory 
Relief Act of 2006, but it was not used until the financial crisis in 2008.49  
This interest rate payment is used along with other tools to implement 
monetary policy.50 
The IOR is the rate at which the Federal Reserve pays interest on 
reserve balances.51 Reserve balances are held at the Federal Reserve and 
are retained by banks to transfer large payments to other financial insti-
tutions.52  The Federal Reserve created IOR in order to enable it to control 
short-term interest rates, broadening government control over the lending 
market.53   
Another tool used to control monetary policy is the federal funds 
rate.54  The federal funds rate is the rate at which banks lend their reserve 
balances to other banks on an overnight basis.55  The Federal Open Mar-
ket Committee (“FOMC”) sets this rate and uses open market operations, 
the selling of government securities, to influence the money supply and 
meet the set target rate.56  The Federal Reserve sets a ceiling for the fed-
eral funds rate with a discount rate, the amount that the Federal Reserve 
charges banks that borrow from the discount window.57  Conversely, the 
 
 48. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF S.F., WHY DID THE FEDERAL RESERVE START PAYING 
INTEREST ON RESERVE BALANCES HELD ON DEPOSIT AT THE FED?  DOES THE FED PAY INTEREST 
ON REQUIRED RESERVES, EXCESS RESERVES, OR BOTH?  WHAT INTEREST RATE DOES THE FED 
PAY? (2013), https://www.frbsf.org/education/publications/doctor-econ/2013/march/federal-
reserve-interest-balances-reserves/.  
 49. Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, 109th Cong. § 201 (2006).  
 50. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF S.F., supra note 48.   
 51. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF S.F., supra note 48.   
 52. Kimberly Amadeo, How Does the Fed Raise or Lower Interest Rates, BALANCE (Nov. 
27, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/how-does-the-fed-raise-or-lower-interest-rates-
3306127. 
 53. See FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, FEDERAL FUND AND INTEREST ON 
RESERVES (2013), https://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed15.html (explaining 
the purpose of IOR).  
 54. Kimberly Amadeo, Fed Funds Rate, Its Impact, and How it Works, BALANCE (last 
updated Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/fed-funds-rate-definition-impact-and-
how-it-works-3306122. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. 
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IOR sets a floor for the federal funds rate because banks will not lend 
money at an interest rate lower than the rate received on reserves.58   
Without IOR, the Federal Reserve would control monetary policy 
by quickly selling its asset holdings.59  This was how the FOMC imple-
mented monetary policy prior to 2008 and was able to do so until the 
financial crisis.60  Many other central banks use this IOR rate to control 
short-term market rates.61  
Because the banks obtain interest on the excess reserves, they will 
not lend to another bank at lower interest rates than they could obtain by 
leaving the funds on deposit at the regional Federal Reserve bank.62  The 
rise in IOR policy is estimated by one study to account for a 61.3% de-
cline in consumer bank lending post-2008.63  The FedAccounts proposal 
raises the concern that the IOR is not passing directly through to consum-
ers but is instead acting as a subsidy to banks.64  By “paying” these banks 
to operate, the proposal asserts that banks are no longer deserving of their 
subsidy when a large part of the population is left out from the services 
offered.65  
Lastly, the proposal asserts that if there is a large transition to 
FedAccounts, it will lead to large-scale stability in the financial mar-
kets.66  This stability comes from an increase in monetary control through 
the Federal Reserve’s ability to change interest rates that would directly 
affect consumers.67  The proposal claims that all of these benefits com-
bined would ultimately lead to a greater trust in the federal government 
by consumers.68 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Ben S. Bernanke & Donald Kohn, The Fed’s Interest Payments to the Bank, 
BROOKINGS (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2016/02/16/the-
feds-interest-payments-to-banks/. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.   
 62. Michael Ng & David Wessel, The Hutchins Center Explains: How the Powell Fed 
Will Raise Interest Rates, BROOKINGS (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-
front/2018/03/15/the-hutchins-center-explains-how-the-powell-fed-will-raise-interest-rates/. 
 63. Hogan, supra note 46. 
 64. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 6. 
 65. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 6. 
 66. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 2. 
 67. See Bernanke & Kohn, supra note 59 (explaining how the Federal Reserve’s interest 
payments to banks implements monetary policy). 
 68. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 2. 
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B.         The Population at Risk 
The population faced with the challenge of being unbanked or 
underbanked varies across the United States population.69  However, the 
probability of being unbanked or underbanked is higher among lower-
income, black and Hispanic, working-age disabled, low-education, and 
younger households.70  Nearly half of people between eighteen and 
twenty-four years of age are unbanked.71  
Collectively, these households spend about $89 billion on interest 
and fees for fringe services such as payday loans and check cashing ser-
vices, averaging at $2,412 per household.72  One in six unbanked house-
holds have used a payday loan, but this drops to one in twenty among 
fully banked households.73  A recent study shows that over half the pop-
ulation of the United States would not be able to access $2,000 in thirty 
days to respond to an emergency.74  
The most frequently reported reason for not having a bank ac-
count among the unbanked and underbanked population is the belief that 
they do not have enough money to keep in a bank account.75  Indeed, 
checking accounts with the lowest monthly fees or minimums to waive 
monthly fees are rare for these consumer profiles, and such consumers 
who gain access usually do not earn interest on their deposits.76  In 2018, 
Bank of America announced it was no longer going to offer free 
 
 69. FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 70.  
 70. FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 70.  
 71. FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 2.  
 72. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE U.S. POSTAL SERV., PROVING NON-BANK FINANCIAL 
SERVICES FOR THE UNDERSERVED (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/document-library-files/2015/rarc-wp-14-007_0.pdf [hereinafter INSPECTOR 
GENERAL USPS REPORT]. 
 73. See Timothy Bates & Constance R. Dunham, Introduction to Focus Issue: Use of 
Financial Services by Low-Income Households, 17(2) ECON. DEV. QUARTERLY 3–7 (2003); 
see also Matt Fellowes & Mia Mabanta, Banking on Wealth: America’s New Retail Banking 
Infrastructure and Its Wealth-Building Potential, BROOKINGS (Jan. 22, 2008), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/banking-on-wealth-americas-new-retail-banking-infra-
structure-and-its-wealth-building-potential/. 
 74. See An Examination of the Availability of Credit for Consumers: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 141 
n.1 (2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg72606/pdf/CHRG-
112hhrg72606.pdf (explaining the statement of Robert W. Mooney, Deputy Director, Con-
sumer Protection and Community Affairs). 
 75. FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 3. 
 76. See generally Wessell, supra note 35. 
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“eBanking” checking accounts and will now charge a $12 monthly fee.77  
The only way to avoid this fee is to have a monthly direct deposit of at 
least $250, maintain a $1,500 daily balance, or be younger than twenty-
four years old.78  These scenarios are likely why 55.8% of unbanked con-
sumers responded in a FDIC survey that banks are “not at all interested” 
in serving consumers like themselves.79 
Other studies have found that these consumers often have a neg-
ative experience which results in a mistrust of banks or they find alterna-
tive fringe banking services to be more convenient.80  Because of this 
opportunity in the market, payday lenders are seeking out the unbanked 
and underbanked population.81  There are more payday lending and 
check-cashing outlets in the United States than McDonald’s locations.82   
Many mainstream banks do not seek out this part of the popula-
tion due to their low deposit balance, leaving a hole that payday lenders 
can fill.83  Some large banks have even closed branches in low-income 
communities with the largest percentages of unbanked Americans.84  
However, even though this population might lack access in some areas, 
the unbanked and underbanked are more likely to use fringe financial ser-
vices even if they are in the same neighborhood as mainstream financial 
institutions.85  
 
 77. Lisa Joyce, Bank of America and the End of Free Checking, FINANCIAL BRAND (Jan. 
29, 2018), https://thefinancialbrand.com/70145/bank-of-america-free-checking/. 
 78. Id.  
 79. FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 3. 
 80. FED. RESERVE BANK OF KAN. CITY, UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED CONSUMERS IN 
THE 10TH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT (2010), https://www.kansascityfed.org/~/me-
dia/files/publicat/research/community/unbankedexecutivesummary.pdf. 
 81. See Caskey, supra note 10. 
 82. Stacy Cowley, Payday Lending Faces Tough New Restrictions by Consumer Agency, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/business/payday-loans-
cfpb.html. 
 83. Nelson D. Schwartz, Banks Closings Tilt Toward Poor Areas, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/business/23banks.html. 
 84. See, e.g., id. (“[For the] first time in 15 years, more bank branches have closed than 
opened across the United States”).   
 85. Fellows & Mabanta, supra note 73. 
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C.         Fringe Banking Services  
The fringe banking industry is fairly new within the United 
States.86  Three decades ago it was almost nonexistent, but today it brings 
in tens of billions of dollars in revenue each year.87  This growth was 
triggered in the 1970s, when states began to raise interest rates or loosen 
restrictions on interest rate ceilings.88  As smaller, local institutions that 
typically met the needs of the small-dollar loan market began to merge 
with larger banks, it reduced the availability of the services offered to the 
lower income population.89  This new market introduced fringe banking 
to an attractive consumer who would be willing to pay a high interest rate 
for a small amount of money, the unbanked and underbanked.90 
Greater consumer access to mainstream financial institutions has 
long been discussed by policymakers.91  The Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau (“CFPB”) has listed this problem along with the increasing 
use of fringe banking as a top priority issue.92  It is problematic for the 
unbanked and underbanked population to operate on a cash-only basis in 
today’s financial marketplace without the ability to receive direct depos-
its and pay bills online.93  Further, short term fringe services providing 
 
 86. See Jerzy Eisenberg-Guyot, Caislin Firth, Marieka Klawitter & Anjum Hajat, From 
Payday Loans to Pawnshops: Fringe Banking, the Unbanked, and Health, 37 HEALTH 
AFFAIRS 3, (2018), https://content.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.2017.1219,  (con-
necting the unbanked population and their access to fringe banking with associated health 
issues).  
 87. Id.  
 88. Id.  
 89. Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Poor Got Cut Out of Banking. 62 EMORY LAW L.J. 483, 
483–548 (2013). 
 90. See GARY RIVLIN, BROKE, USA: FROM PAWNSHOPS TO POVERTY, INC.—HOW THE 
WORKING POOR BECAME BIG BUSINESS, 41–43 (2010) (discussing how widespread the fringe 
banking services are and discussing how they impact communities).  
 91. CONSUMERS AND MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 9.   
 92. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC INCLUSION, FED. DEPOSIT INS. 
CORP. http://www.fdic.gov/about/comein (outlining the Committee’s ongoing initiatives to 
expand access to underserved populations); see also Kelly Thompson Cochran, FALL 2013 
RULEMAKING AGENDA, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Dec. 3, 2013) (discussing the 
how the Dodd-Frank Act requirements were implemented to preserve credit in “rural or un-
derserved areas”). 
 93. See FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 1 (discussing the difficulties the unbanked 
population faces and what needs to be done to fix these issues). 
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credit to these consumers may charge interest at annual percentage rates 
of up to 400-600%.94  
Although there are currently some regulations on predatory lend-
ers and proposed legislation to restrict them further, regulation has yet to 
bring banking solutions to the unbanked and underbanked population.95  
Mick Mulvaney, then Acting Director of the CFPB, announced in Janu-
ary of 2018 that the CFPB would revise payday lending regulations en-
acted during the Obama Administration are to come into effect on August 
19, 2019.96  The CFPB recently announced on February 6, 2019 they plan 
to rescind97 the mandatory provisions of the Payday Lending Rule prom-
ulgated in November of 2017.98  Any revision, even under the new Acting 
Director Kathy Kraninger, will presumably be more favorable to payday 
lenders than the original regulation.99  
Even if there were a regulation heavily restricting payday lenders, 
if payday lenders are restricted and removed from the current market 
there is concern that the unbanked and underbanked will be even further 
left out of the lending market.100  Therefore, rather than having access to 
 
 94. Nathalie Martin & Ozymandias Adams, Grand Theft Auto Loans: Repossession and 
Demographic Realities in Title Lending, MO. L. REV. 41, 46 (2012). 
 95. See Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 876 
(2007) (discussing payday lending and how highly visible providers are better for consumers 
than smaller one shop lenders).  
 96. The Regulatory Future of Payday Lending, PYMNTS.COM (Aug. 14, 2018), 
https://www.pymnts.com/news/alternative-financial-services/2018/payday-lending-short-
term-loans-regulations-cfpb/. 
 97. The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection proposed to rescind sections of the 
“Payday, Vehicles Title, and certain High-Cost Installment Loans,” specifically  (1) provide 
that it is an unfair and abusive practice for a lender to make a covered short-term or longer-
term balloon-payment loan, including payday and vehicle title loans, without reasonably de-
termining that consumers have the ability to repay those loans according to their terms; (2) 
prescribe mandatory underwriting requirements for making the ability-to-repay determina-
tion; (3) exempt certain loans from the underwriting requirements; and (4) establish related 
definitions, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements.  See RULES UNDER DEVELOPMENT, 
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, (last viewed Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.con-
sumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/rulemaking/rules-under-development/payday-vehicle-
title-and-certain-high-cost-installment-loans/. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Stacey Coley, Mulvaney Sides with Payday Lenders Asking Court to Block Re-
strictions, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/05/business/cfpb-
payday-lenders-mulvaney.html (discussing Mulvaney’s attempt to block the payday lending 
restrictions in a joint motion in federal court). 
 100. Mann & Hawkins, supra note 95. 
462 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 23 
 
some lenders, even though they offer services at extremely high rates, the 
unbanked and underbanked would be lacking any resource at all.101  
Although the FedAccounts proposal does not plan to offer lend-
ing, this part of the population lacks access to this important economic 
resource.102  Further, the proposal will likely put stress on the banking 
institutions’ lending markets.103  This will likely only facilitate fringe 
banking services and predatory lending practices.104  
III.  ISSUES WITH THE PROPOSALS 
The FedAccounts proposal claims that it is “remarkable” how 
many problems it would mitigate or solve through its implementation.105  
Although some positive effects would likely come from the program—
including no interchange fees and real-time payment—there are likely 
more substantial issues that the proposal would induce if implemented as 
planned.106  Not only would this proposal unnecessarily strain the bank-
ing industry by removing a large amount of deposits from banks, but the 
population of the unbanked and underbanked would likely not benefit as 
much as predicted from the implementation of the FedAccounts pro-
posal.107  
A.         Government Intervention 
Government involvement and ownership of banks is widespread 
around the world, especially in countries with low levels of per capita 
income and undeveloped financial systems.108  However, one study has 
found that government ownership of banks is connected to slower devel-
opment of the financial system, lower economic growth, and lower 
 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id.   
 103. See infra Part III.C. 
 104. Mann & Hawkins, supra note 95, at 876. 
 105. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6. 
 106. See Caskey, supra note 10.   
 107. See Caskey, supra note 10; Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6. 
 108. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Government 
Ownership of Banks (Harv. Univ., Working Paper No. 01-016, 2000), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.236434. 
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productivity growth.109  Another study suggests that once government 
banks undertake “political interference,” their financial performance de-
teriorates.110  These theories suggest that when the government is in con-
trol of banks, or when consumers have accounts at the Federal Reserve, 
the lending decisions become driven by politics rather than economics 
and will further lead to slowing economic growth.111  
The regional Federal Reserve Banks are owned by national banks 
or state-chartered member banks in their region.112  The mass migration 
to the Federal Reserve banks addressed in the proposal would deprive 
these private banks of a large part of their deposits.113  Therefore, bringing 
about this large change would be difficult without a different ownership 
structure.114  
The proposal addresses this issue by claiming the broad migration 
to the FedAccounts would require the Federal Reserve to extend “dis-
count window loans to offset banks’ lost deposit balance.”115  Accord-
ingly, the Federal Reserve would be paying depositors between 2-
2.50%—the IOR rate current to this writing—and then using those funds 
to loan back to banks at 2.75%—the discount rate current to this writ-
ing—for a spread of fifty to seventy-five basis points as profit.116  This 
differs from the current rate of .05% to .08% that banks currently receive, 
a much costlier source of funding.117   
The proposal further states that this will “insulate[] the central 
bank’s investment function from the appearance or reality of political 
 
 109. Id. at 6–7. 
 110. Chung-Hua Shen & Chih-Yung Lin, Why Government Banks Underperform: A Po-
litical Interference View, 21 J.  FIN. INTERMEDIATION 181 (2012). 
 111. Mark A. Calabria, Public Banking Hurts Economics, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/10/01/should-states-operate-public-
banks/public-banking-hurts-economic. 
 112. FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, WHO OWNS RESERVE BANKS, https://www.stlou-
isfed.org/in-plain-english/who-owns-the-federal-reserve-banks (last visited Jan.  23, 2019). 
 113. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 7. 
 114. See WHO OWNS RESERVE BANKS, supra note 112 (stating that the Federal Reserve 
has stock that is owned by commercial banks).  
 115. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6. 
 116. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED RESERVE SYSTEM, POLICY TOOLS:  OPEN MARKET 
OPERATIONS, (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmar-
ket.htm. 
 117. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED RESERVE SYSTEM, POLICY TOOLS:  THE DISCOUNT 
RATE (last updated Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/discoun-
trate.htm.  
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meddling or favoritism.”118  Consumers on a mass scale do not entirely 
understand what the Federal Reserve does, and public trust in the Federal 
Reserve is at a historic low.119  The Federal Reserve is designed to be 
politically independent.120  With this goal in mind, the institution was cre-
ated to be accountable to the public, the Federal Open Market Committee, 
and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve by implementing 
monetary policies that are meant to achieve long-term macroeconomic 
objectives.121  However, the President of the United States appoints the 
Federal Reserve chair.122  Although the appointment process is not inher-
ently motivated by politics, history shows that it can be.123  During his 
1972 campaign, President Nixon encouraged his elected Federal Reserve 
chair to employ monetary stimulus to cause a booming economy.124  In 
the short-term, there was no issue.125  However, in the long term this led 
to global inflation and brought an end to fixed exchange rates.126   
Further, the Federal Reserve has received criticism by the current 
United States President, Donald J. Trump.127  These comments128 broke 
 
 118. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6. 
 119. Marth C. White, Nobody Really Knows What the Fed Does, but They Think It’s Bad 
Anyway, NBC NEWS (July 25, 2017, 7:30 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/econ-
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Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs.htm. 
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 123. See Kenneth Rogoff, Is the Federal Reserve Playing Politics, GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 
2016), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/oct/03/federal-reserve-playing-politics-
janet-yellen-central-banks-us-government (explaining the historical long term effects of the 
Federal Reserve Chair’s, Arthur Burns, decisions on monetary policy that were politically 
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 126. Id. 
 127. See David J. Lynch, Trump Criticizes Federal Reserve, Breaking Long-standing 
Practice, WASH. POST (July 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/busi-
ness/2018/07/19/trump-criticizes-federal-reserve-breaking-long-standing-prac-
tice/?utm_term=.723de0022379 (covering Trump’s comments about the Federal Reserve and 
explaining the reasoning behind the silence of past presidents on the subject). 
 128. See e.g., @realdonaldtrump, TWITTER (Dec. 18, 2018, 4:13 AM), https://twit-
ter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1075001077576151041?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctw-
camp%5Etweetembed%7Ctw-
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a long time presidential norm followed since the Clinton administration, 
that the President declines to comment on the monetary policy decisions 
of the Federal Reserve to avoid political influence.129  The risk of political 
influence on a federal agency so integral to the economy is concerning, 
especially with attempts to expand this influence by giving FedAccounts 
to the public.130   
Studies show that when central banks can conduct monetary pol-
icy operations free of political pressure, the economy observes better in-
flation rates.131  A risk of this influence on the market is an acceleration 
of inflation.132  Economists have expressed concern about the Federal Re-
serve needing to reduce the size of its balance sheet as banks decrease its 
reserves and increase lending.133  This proposal will prevent the Federal 
Reserve from reducing its balance sheet and will have the immediate im-
pact of increasing security purchases.134  
Policymakers must take a long-term perspective, rather than a 
short-term perspective that may be politically motivated, to successfully 
implement proper policy efforts that work to stabilize prices and increase 
employment.135  Political influence on the powerful Federal Reserve, 
only increased through FedAccount control, could lead to a less produc-
tive economy and even lead to economic failure overall.136  
 
 129. See Lynch, supra note 127 (covering Trump’s comments about the Federal Reserve 
and explaining the reasoning behind past president’s silence on the subject).  
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Mainstream banks provide inclusive financial services to con-
sumers in other countries without consumers banking at central banks.137  
For example, Canada has accomplished a consumer inclusion rate of 
99%.138  The FedAccount proposal states that Canadian banks are re-
quired to open accounts to all with proper identification and a credit his-
tory void of fraud.139  Further, there is regulation of the large banks by 
the government to offer low-fee accounts.  Although, interestingly, the 
inclusion rate was just as high in 2001 prior to these regulations.140 
A Canadian economist suggests two major differences that could 
be the reason for the large gap in percent of the unbanked and un-
derbanked in the two countries: culture and poverty rates.141  However, 
the United States differs only by a few percentage points with a 17% pov-
erty rate compared to Canada’s 12%.142  The author also suggests that it 
could be a supply issue as well with the ability of Canadian banks to his-
torically set up extensive banking networks.143  Without a large change 
to the United States banking system and regulations, there is little chance 
that the unbanked and underbanked issues could be solved in the way that 
Canada has done.144  
Further, unbanked consumers in the United States cite their lack 
of trust in banks and low income as reasons for not holding an account.145  
Therefore, rather than access to accounts or interest rates, there are likely 
more reasons than FedAccounts addresses for the United States’ un-
banked and underbanked population being left out of the mainstream fi-
nancial system.146  
 
 137. WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO SEPARATE FEDERAL RESERVE MONETARY POLICY DECISIONS 
FROM POLITICAL INFLUENCE, supra note 131. 
 138. J.P. Koning, Central Banking for the Unbanked?, AM. INST. ECON. RES. (Aug. 28, 
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 141. Koning, supra note 138. 
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 146. See Koning, supra note 138 (stating that high rates of poverty and a mistrust in the 
system is a main reason for unbanked Americans not possessing bank accounts).  
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FedAccounts would take the opportunity to reach this part of the 
population from the private sector.147  There are areas of the private sec-
tor, even outside mainstream banking, that are currently making efforts 
to offer free deposit accounts and alternatives to payday loans.148  Alt-
hough many mainstream banks have been reluctant to enter this market, 
some  private financial services are taking action to reach out to these 
consumers.149  More than 70%  of online banks—an emerging banking 
service in the financial markets—offer free checking accounts.150   
For example, U.S. Bank is set to offer a small-dollar alternative 
to payday loans.151  On September 10, 2018, the U.S. Bank announced 
that it would allow existing checking account customers to borrow be-
tween $100 and $1,000 for three months.152  The program is called the 
“Simple Loan” and U.S. Bank maintains its loans are more affordable 
than payday loans.153  For some consumers, especially the unbanked and 
underbanked, this is the best option for small-dollar loans.154  
The U.S. Bank announcement came after a push from the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency in late 2017 for banks to find ways to 
compete against the payday lending industry.155  At first, there were no 
banks interested in entering the market.156  However, it seems that main-
stream banks have since recognized the opportunity in the market.157  
Only 29% of Americans have an emergency fund.158  This new loan pro-
gram from U.S. Bank, along with the availability of free deposit accounts, 
would not only solve the depositing issue but the credit issue as well, 
which FedAccounts does not address.159 
 
 147. See Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6 (stating that the plan is to dramatically 
decrease the private banking industry).  
 148. See Wisniewski, supra note 18 (explaining a bank’s new option to give customers a 
“Simple Loan”, a small dollar credit option that will compete with payday lenders). 
 149. Wisniewski, supra note 18.  
 150. Joyce, supra note 77.  
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 153. Wisniewski, supra note 18. 
 154. Wisniewski, supra note 18. 
 155. Wisniewski, supra note 18. 
 156. Wisniewski, supra note 18. 
 157. Wisniewski, supra note 18. 
 158. Wisniewski, supra note 18. 
 159. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 4.  
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Lastly, the Federal Reserve would have to implement programs, 
such as ATM cards, and customer service efforts in the attempt to offer 
bank accounts to everyone.160  The administration of mass consumer ac-
counts would take time to implement when there are already other private 
and even public financial institutions that are better equipped to do so.161  
The FedAccounts program would decrease the profits and therefore the 
overall size of banking institutions leading to less bank branches.162  
There is an essential place in the United States market for com-
mercial banks.163  Governments do not have the same incentives to spur 
economic development as do private entities.164  Government assistance 
is useful to assist in providing services for this part of the populations.165  
A better system is one that works with private banks rather than against 
them.166  If the Federal Reserve creates bank accounts for all consumers, 
they will be replacing a function that could be conducted by commercial 
entities.167   
B.         Consumer Access to IOR   
The proposal further suggests that all accounts at the Federal Re-
serve receive the same IOR that banks have on their Federal Reserve ac-
counts.168  The proposal states that the Federal Reserve will exhibit 
greater monetary control and policy through a direct pass of policy rates 
to a large amount of deposit account holders.169  Therefore, the Federal 
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Reserve would have their primary tool for controlling monetary policy 
directly on every account at the Federal Reserve.170   
While the report references “high-interest rates,” these interest 
rates are just currently higher than what banks are giving for their deposit 
accounts.171  While the IOR rate is currently at 2.20 %, the FOMC might 
just lower the IOR rate if there is a mass transition to the Federal Reserve 
deposit accounts.172  There is no guarantee that IOR will stay higher than 
bank deposit rates or even be permanently paid through the Federal Re-
serve.173  The FOMC committed to remove IOR in the future after it ac-
complishes economic stabilization.174  The Federal Reserve would also 
be able to exhibit monetary policy tactics on these accounts, opening the 
door for possible negative interest rates to increase the money supply in 
the marketplace.175   
Adding excess reserves to the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet 
would either cause a massive increase in the amount of IOR paid out or 
decrease the IOR to lower the cost of paying interest.176  Interfering with 
such a new, and even controversial, monetary policy tool such as IOR is 
a risky proposition.177  If IOR were to dissipate or substantially decrease 
too quickly, banks would try to lend their excess reserves excessively, 
possibly collapsing short-term interest rates.178  
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While the FedAccounts proposal may attempt financial inclusion 
through passing IOR rates to all consumers, overall it seems as if it is a 
disapproval of the current IOR policy.179  Therefore, it would still be a 
concern that if policymakers implemented this plan, it will not likely 
reach consumers any more than the current market can do.180 
C.         Lending  
Allowing private individuals to bank at the Federal Reserve 
would blur the line between commercial banks and the central bank.181  
Because of the instantaneous payment clearing and no minimum deposit 
that FedAccounts offer, the authors assume that take-up in the program 
would be robust.182  One significant consequence of this proposal is the 
effect of the availability of lending and overall increase in lending costs 
to businesses and consumers. 
The business practice of mainstream financial banking services is 
taking in consumer deposits and offering loans.183  Banks offer these de-
posits to the public as “risk-free” holding accounts backed by the FDIC 
insurance.184  To pay interest and provide services, such as check clear-
ing, banks need to use deposits to make money.185  Lending money to 
consumers for residential mortgages or personal financing comes with 
risk, sometimes high risks.186  Banks often offset these risks by diversi-
fying their loans, qualifying borrowers, and taking collateral.187  This is 
an imperfect business model but is essential to the market to provide 
loans, encouraging economic development.188  
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The proposal—along with some economists—refer to IOR as a 
subsidy.189  However, mainstream banks cannot profit as easily as the 
proposal suggests just by borrowing reserves and then depositing to ob-
tain IOR.190  If this were the case, banks would likely replace deposits 
and then use reserves to fund loans bearing higher interest rate income 
than IOR offers.191  Alternative institutions do not bear costs such as pre-
miums paid to the FDIC which burden mainstream banks.192  
The proposal clearly does not envision FedAccounts as a means 
of directly providing credit to account holders.193  The proposal brings up 
the possibility that with its enactment it could increase the costs of credit 
by removing subsidies through taking away the interest rate exclusive to 
banks at the Federal Reserve.194  The proposal states that this would be a 
positive effect because it would make the lending market more competi-
tive.195  However, because of the increased costs of funding mentioned 
above with the discount window loans, interest rates on the loans banks 
will make will likely go up as well.196  The downside for consumers and 
businesses will be an increased cost of credit.197  
Mainstream banking will not be encouraged to reach out and pro-
vide loans to the unbanked and underbanked population.198  Making the 
lending market more exclusive and competitive will make low-income 
credit seekers even less attractive to banks with the decrease in available 
lending.199  Lending would become a privilege only to those institutions 
that are able to pay extremely high-interest rates to attract consumers.200  
 
 189. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 11. 
 190. Bernanke & Kohn, supra note 59. 
 191. Bernanke & Kohn, supra note 59.  
 192. Levine, supra note 184. 
 193. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 11.  
 194. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 11. 
 195. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 11. 
 196. Baradaran, supra note 89. 
 197. Baradaran, supra note 89. 
 198. See Casey Hynes, How Social Media Could Help The Unbanked Land a Loan, 
FORBES (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chynes/2017/04/25/how-data-will-
help-drive-universal-financial-access/#7c27adb057e6 (exploring the value of using non-tra-
ditional data to make credit decisions and the effort banks are or should be making to capture 
the business of the unbanked population).  
 199. Milton Ezrati, Competition Between Banks and Alternative Lenders: The Public 
Wins, FORBES (June 15, 2018),  https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2018/06/15/com-
petition-between-banks-and-alternative-lenders-the-public-wins/#4df9a5c2bf26. 
 200. Id. 
472 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 23 
 
The unbanked and underbanked benefit the least out of this aspect of the 
proposal and financial inclusion would stay the same or even become 
worse.201 
IV.  ALTERNATIVES 
A.         Postal Banking  
In 2014, the USPS released a report that argued it was capable of 
offering financial services to mend the unbanked and underbanked is-
sue.202  The USPS could be utilized as a unique outlet to provide that 
access to financial services as certain consumers’ alternative to large fi-
nancial institutions.203  This is promoted to the banking industry as non-
competitive because most of these consumers would be mostly outside of 
their typical target consumer.204 
The FedAccounts proposal mentions the use of the USPS as a 
physical location for FedAccounts’ services.205  However, postal banking 
differs from the FedAccounts proposal by offering the small dollar lend-
ing important to the unbanked and underbanked population.206  The 
agency already has in place many of the administrative functions that the 
FedAccounts proposal would require of the Federal Reserve.207  Further, 
many unbanked and underbanked consumers already use these financial 
services provided at USPS, such as money orders.208  
There has been growing discussion around the concept of postal 
banking.209  Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) recently proposed 
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Thought, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS (Apr. 2016), https://www.stlouisfed.org/publica-
tions/regional-economist/april-2016/interest-rate-control-is-more-complicated-than-you-
thought. 
 202. Baradaran, supra note 8. 
 203. Baradaran, supra note 8. 
 204. Baradaran, supra note 8. 
 205. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 11. 
 206. Baradaran, supra note 8. 
 207. U.S. POSTAL SERV., PROVIDING NON-BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR THE 
UNDERSERVED (2014), http://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-library-
files/2014/rarc-wp-14-007.pdf. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Baradaran, supra note 8. 
2019] BANKING AT THE FED 473 
 
legislation that would add consumer financial services to USPS.210  The 
idea of postal banking has also gained the support of Senators Bernie 
Sanders (I-VT) and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), and the USPS Inspector 
General.211  Further, Mehrsa Baradaran, a national authority on postal 
banking and the author of How the Other Half Banks, advised Senator 
Gillibrand on crafting the proposed legislation.212 
The postal banking proposal would require USPS to offer basic 
banking services to consumers such as savings accounts, debit cards, and 
even simple loans.213  The legislation claims to be a straightforward so-
lution to reach the unbanked and underbanked population and replace the 
need to resort to fringe banking services.214  USPS claims to be able to 
provide the services offered by fringe banking and even mainstream 
banking at a lower price.215  For example, USPS suggests that it can offer 
a $375 loan with interest and fees totaling $48, compared to a fee of  $520 
for the average payday lender.216   
Postal banking is common and often successful in other coun-
tries.217  According to the United Nations’ Universal Postal Union, 183 
national postal services offer some financial services.218  Further, eighty-
seven of them provide checking and savings accounts.219  Currently, the 
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USPS has 30,000 locations, of which 59% are in “banking desserts,” or 
zip codes that have just one bank branch or no bank branches at all.220  
Postal banking is also not a revolutionary concept, as it has a 
strong historical background in the United States.221  In 1910, the United 
States government established The Postal Savings System and allowed 
Americans to have a deposit at the post office.222  At the time, these ac-
counts offered a 2% interest rate.223  From 1911 to 1967, the USPS of-
fered savings and deposit services.224  Banks were opposed to this at first, 
because it was perceived as possible competition225  Although soon after 
the approval, banks came to understand that the Postal Savings System 
captured a considerable amount of money out of consumer pockets.226  
Therefore, it brought broad benefits by incurring funds that would not 
have been deposited at banks otherwise.227  Mainstream financial services 
would likely have a similar response today.228 
Deposits at the Postal Savings Systems were discontinued in 1967 
because banks and other financial institutions raised their interest rates, 
which led to mass transition to private deposits.229  However, the USPS 
still serves the financial interest of some consumers by issuing money 
orders as well as prepaid debit cards through American Express.230   
There will be a positive effect from returning postal banking to 
the United States at this juncture due to the fair lending needs of the un-
banked and underbanked population.231  Further, the at-risk population 
would be apt to take action and join this financial service more so than 
other alternatives.232  Seventy-seven percent of those who use alternative 
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financial services have a favorable view of the customer service offered 
at their local USPS.233  
Instead of banks partnering with predatory lenders, banks could 
partner with the USPS.234  There are five potential products for postal 
banking to offer: postal cards, interest-bearing savings accounts, small-
dollar loans, debit cards, and checking accounts.235  Debit cards and 
checking accounts should have little pushback from the consumer bank-
ing system since this service would likely reach consumers who are not 
part of the current system.236  The interest-bearing savings account could 
be at a competitive rate, but not necessarily the IOR rate.237  Therefore, 
this would encourage banks to offer fair rates or exit this market in gen-
eral if they do not find these customers to be favorable clients.238  
The more aspirational aspect of the postal banking proposal from 
Senator Gillibrand that could receive some pushback from fringe banking 
businesses would be the small dollar loan services.239  This unbanked and 
underbanked population currently needs small dollar loan services the 
FedAccounts proposal does not offer.240  Therefore it is essential for 
postal banking to offer this aspect of the service even if it puts pressure 
on the payday lending community.241  
 
 233. U.S. POSTAL SERV., The Road Ahead for Postal Financial Services (May 21, 2015), 
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The bill suggests interest rates on credit in line with the Depart-
ment of Treasury’s one-month constant maturity rate, currently under 
2%.242  However, the USPS Inspector General suggests interest rates on 
the loans at a much higher rate of 25%.243  There will have to be a nego-
tiation on this rate to either raise it or make it flexible depending on the 
borrower before the bill passes.244  The suggested rate of 2% is likely too 
low to extend loans in the circumstances of the unbanked and un-
derbanked population.245 
Additionally, there is the risk that the population that the USPS 
intends to service with these loans are more likely to default.246  However, 
the USPS can enlist the services of the Internal Revenue Service and other 
federal agencies that have the power to garnish wages or tax returns, an 
ability that payday lenders do not have and therefore charge for the per-
ceived high-risk lending.247 
Ultimately, a smaller loan service offering either of these interest 
rates would likely be overly competitive for current payday lenders and 
put financial strain on their business.248  Senator Gillibrand249 suggests 
that the only legislator that would oppose her proposal would be one who 
will want to protect payday lender profits.250  However, there is likely a 
significant group that will want to protect payday lenders.251  The payday 
lending industry has made $14 million in total political contributions 
since 2010.252  Nevertheless, Baradaran suggests that USPS has the 
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ability and legal authority to expand its sources of revenue without addi-
tional action from Congress, making action possible without the bill pass-
ing.253  
Lastly, this system could be of assistance to USPS.254  The USPS 
is the United States’ second-largest employer and is self-funded without 
taxpayer support,255 but despite these figures the service is currently fi-
nancially strained.256  International post offices have obtained substantial 
revenue by offering financial services.257  This market opportunity could 
add $8.9 billion per year to USPS.258  Further, the plan would essentially 
be cost-free to the taxpayer.259  This plan provides services for the popu-
lation at risk while co-existing with private financial institutions.260  
B.         State Public Banks   
State public banks are financial institutions that allow state or city 
borrowing to be controlled by the state government.261  Instead of paying 
a private institution to hold the public’s money, the state would own the 
banking institution.262  This process claims to not only save on banking 
fees but also focus on investing the public banks’ profits back into the 
community.263  
State public banks might also offer opportunities that the Federal 
Reserve and FedAccounts will not.264  When surveyed, the unbanked and 
underbanked population listed their number one reason for not having a 
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bank account as “I don’t like dealing with banks.”265  However, state pub-
lic banks have the opportunity to change this response from consumers 
by delivering the trust and client specific services needed by their local-
ized population.  
The Federal Reserve has the reputation of being a large, distant 
government organization with which consumers—especially the un-
banked and underbanked population—have very little familiarity.266  A 
state-run bank offering these services customized to the state’s consumer 
needs may well establish direct, customized contact with these customers 
that are typically uncomfortable dealing with traditional banks.267  State-
run banks would be known for providing specific services for these 
groups.268  
The Bank of North Dakota, which has operated and managed 
public funds for nearly 100 years, serves as an example of a successful 
state-run bank operation.269  The Bank of North Dakota was founded in 
1919 to create reliable access to affordable credit for the state’s farmers 
and businesses and is the nation’s only state-run bank.270  The bank cur-
rently makes low-interest loans to students, smalls businesses, and 
startups.271  The Bank of North Dakota claims it “is successful because 
[they] are partners with North Dakota’s financial institutions, not com-
petitors.”272  This partnership works by state public banks making loans 
that a private institution might find less profitable.273  In the last ten years, 
the bank has transferred nearly $300 million in profits to the North Da-
kota treasury.274  
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The success of the Bank of North Dakota has inspired an ongoing 
campaign to create the Public Bank of New York City.275  The idea is that 
it would serve as a fully functional bank owned and operated by the city 
by serving as a “public trust invested in social justice, accountable to the 
public.”276  The city’s taxes, fees, and local revenue are currently held in 
corporate bank accounts.277  Therefore, the banks that hold these deposit 
accounts can dictate the lending and interest rates.278   
The Public Bank NYC Coalition calls for a transition of power 
with a publicly operated financial institution supported by the belief that 
“public money should work for the public good.”279  The coalition lists 
the goals of the NYC public bank as making equitable investments, co-
operative community development, affordable financial services, and ac-
countability.280   
New York City is not the only area calling for a public bank.281  
The state of Washington passed a bill earlier in 2018 to create a public 
bank.282  Several California cities are doing feasibility studies with Los 
Angeles having a set back on their localized bank by putting it to a recent 
unsuccessful popular vote.283  Although not yet popular, state public 
banks are gaining attention within the United States as an alternative for 
public banking.284 
State public banks could start reaching out to this part of the pop-
ulation by providing check cashing services even to those who do not 
hold an account.285  The unbanked and underbanked population are likely 
to be slow to transition into the system by opening deposit accounts due 
to little month-to-month savings, welfare ineligibility, or the risk of 
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creditor access.286  Getting consumers involved in a state public bank 
through low-dollar check cashing without needing accounts allows them 
to become part of the banking process by gradually integrating them into 
the banking system.287  State-run banks could even go one step further 
and encourage these depositors to build savings and even establish in-
vestment accounts.288  
State-run banks could also be of assistance to consumers in the 
short term through small-dollar lending.289  Currently, this is not an at-
tractive area of the market for banks to enter because the processing and 
monitoring costs are high when compared to the small amount of the 
loan.290  However, state banks partnering with a philanthropic foundation 
specific to their community could arrange collateral for this high-risk, 
low profit lending.291  The organization could raise money through its 
foundation and place these funds at the state bank.292  By applying 
through the organization, consumers could gain access to short-term, 
small-dollar loans by using the organization’s deposit as collateral.293  
This would serve as a community check on lending services while provid-
ing emergency small-dollar loans to those consumers who need them.294  
FedAccounts do not initiate this same partnership approach as 
state-run banks, but instead create tension between the Federal Reserve 
and commercial banking institutions.295  Further, this program cannot 
help this part of the population if they are not able to get them to establish 
a FedAccount.296 
Rather than allow the Federal Reserve to act on such a significant 
scale, state banks could serve the public and work compatibly with 
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private financial institutions instead of creating a program to reduce their 
size and ability to function.297 
 C.        Mobile Financial Services  
Another route to engaging the unbanked and underbanked popu-
lation and encouraging universal financial service access is through mo-
bile financial services.298  Mobile phones have become a standard for 
Americans in the last decade.299  This technological advancement led to 
an increase in the accessibility of banking services through innovative 
financial service technologies.300  Banks could add $380 billion annually 
in revenue by reaching out to the unbanked and underbanked popula-
tion.301  Because of the opportunity in the market, banks that do not start 
to make this transition into the market will be pressed to compete with 
the outside competition from technology companies.302 
The FedAccounts proposal notes that—although other countries 
have had success—the United States should not be willing to wait on the 
technology.303  Although this would likely take some time, mobile bank-
ing access does not seem far from reaching every corner of society.304  
Thanks to lower transaction costs, mobile banking would enable banks to 
reach this part of the population cost-effectively.305 
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Sixty-three percent of unbanked consumers have a mobile phone, 
and 91% of underbanked consumers have a mobile phone.306  Further, 
underbanked households are more likely than their unbanked and fully 
banked counterparts to have smartphones.307  
Kenya serves as a successful example of the benefit that mobile 
payment systems can have on the inclusion of underserved banking con-
sumers.308  Sixty percent of Kenyan adults over the age of fifteen use 
mobile payments to send money.309  M-PESA, a Kenyan mobile phone-
based money transfer and financing company, uses simple text messaging 
to allow people to transfer money.310  In India, mobile financial services 
extend financial access to approximately 43% of the unbanked popula-
tion.311 
There are currently partnerships with technology companies and 
banking institutions to create financial products to reach the unbanked 
and underbanked.312  For example, PayPal is planning to offer consumer 
debit cards connected to PayPal accounts that would offer direct deposit 
along with other services.313  The fees are small for ATM withdrawals 
and check deposits,  and the service does not require monthly fees or min-
imum balances.314  Amazon is also exploring the option of getting in-
volved in banking services.315 
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Further, large technology firms, such as PayPal and Amazon, 
have formed lobbying groups to discuss “issues on mobile payment and 
payment processing” relating to underserved consumers.316  These groups 
are engaging in more than just payment processing and have started of-
fering lending services.317  For example, Apple offers loans for iPhones, 
and Amazon conducts small-business lending.318  Both of these services 
have grown rapidly since their introduction to the market.319  
If mainstream financial institutions are not willing to reach out to 
unbanked and underbanked consumers because of a lack of profitability, 
there is a sector in the private market that is trying to find a way to reach 
this part of the population.320  However, if there is a lack in profitability 
for whole or parts of this sector, mobile financial services will likely have 
to partner with government efforts such as postal banking or state banks 
to serve this part of the population adequately.321 
V.  CONCLUSION 
FedAcccounts would undoubtedly bring about substantial finan-
cial change to the United States economy.322  However, it is questionable 
how much of this change would be for the good of the economy.323  Fe-
dAccounts will likely not be inclusive of the unbanked and underbanked 
population and lacks the lending aspect of the financial services that this 
part of the populations needs most.324  Regardless of the strategy used to 
reach this part of the population, it is vital that it small-dollar lending be 
provided for the unbanked and underbanked population.325  
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FedAccounts will also introduce a large amount of government 
intervention into the private banking sector, which would likely slow eco-
nomic growth and development.326  Finally, unlike other alternatives to 
reach the unbanked and underbanked population, FedAccounts would 
work against mainstream financial institutions.327  These alternatives, 
such as postal banking, state banks, and mobile financial services, will 
have less drastic effects and better serve consumers.328  
FedAccounts, while nobly attempting financial inclusion, are not 
the best solution to meet this end in the United States economy.329  Poli-
cymakers should strive to find and create a solution that works harmoni-
ously with the current private sector while still offering assistance.330  Alt-
hough the unbanked and underbanked are challenging to reach, 
innovative strategies show promise to reach this part of the population.331   
 
 
What is certain is that this part of the population cannot be left out of 
mainstream financial services any longer.332   
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